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OBJECTIONS TO DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
ELwYN L. CADY, JR.*
Demonstrative evidence' has captured the imagination of advocates as
a forceful means of persuasion in legal controversies.2 Emphasis on this
mode of presentation has undergone a cyclic history which was aptly
described by a commentator writing seventy years ago as follows:
In the early and rude ages there was a strong leaning toward
the adoption of demonstrative and practical tests upon disputed
questions. Doubting Thomases demanded the satisfaction of their
senses . . . . As society grew civilized and refined, it seemed dis-
posed to despise these demonstrative methods, and incline more to
the preference of a narration, at second-hand, by ear and ear wit-
nesses. But in this busy century there seems to have been a relapse
toward the earlier experimental spirit, and a disposition to make
assurance doubly sure by any practical method addressed to the
senses.
3
*Medicolegal consultant; of the Independence, Kansas City, and St. Louis
Bars; LL.B. 1951, Tulane, B.S.Med. 1955, Missouri; Formerly Director, Law-Medi-
cine Program, University of Kansas City, Assistant Director of the Law-Science
Institute and Associate Professor of Law, University of Texas.
Substantial assistance in the preparation of this study was rendered by Jack
R. Wahlquist of the Dallas, Texas Bar and moral encouragement was supplied by
Ike Skelton Jr. of the Lexington, Missouri Bar whose earlier critique of demonstra-
tive evidence in the pages of the Review was of pioneering dimensions. See Skelton,
The Use of Demonstrative Evidence in Missouri, 21 Mo. L. REv. 57 (1956).
1. Other terms are real evidence, objective evidence, and Wigmore's autop-
tic proference. In addition, under Wigmore's scheme, the category "Non-verbal
Expression" (a subdivision under "Narration as a Testimonial Element") is in-
cluded. WiGmoRE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF, 633 et seq. (3d ed. 1937).
2. American Jurisprudence has roughly tripled the space allotted this topic.
20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 716 et seq. (1939); 29 Am. Jur. 2d. Evidence § 769 et seq.(1967).
See generally: Lay, The Use of Real Evidence, 37 NEBR. L. REv. 501 (1958);
Kilroy, Seeing is Believing, 8 KA. L. Ray. 445 (1960); Ladd, Demonstrative Evi-
dence and Expert Opinion, 1956 WAsH. U. L. Q. 1; Hinshaw, Use and Abuse of
Demonstrative Evidence: The Art of Jury Persuasion, 40 A.B.A.J. 479 (1954); 32
MICH. ST. B. J. 7 (1953); Dooley, Demonstrative Evidence-Nothing New, 42
ILL. B. J. 136 (1953); Bunge, Demonstrative Evidence-A Grandstand Play?, 42
ILL. B. J. "72 (1953); Note, Real Evidence: Use and Abuse, 14 BROOKLYN L. REV.
261 (1948).
3. Browne, Practical Tests in Evidence, 4 GREEN BAG 510 (1892). Compare
BELLI, THE USE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE IN ACHIEVING "THE MORE ADEQUATE
AwARD" (1952), a monograph based on an address before the Mississippi State Bar
Association, reported in 22 Miss. L. J. 284 (1951), later expanded into three-vol-
ume treatise, MODERN TRIALS (1954); Belli, Demonstrative Evidence, 10 Wyo. L. J.
15 (1955) ("the surgery of the lawsuit"); An Introduction to Demonstrative Evi-
dence, 8 J. FOR. Sci. 355 (1963).
(333)
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One of the earliest reported uses was in Watsonis Tria 4 wherein a
sketch of a flag, alleged to have been used in inciting a treasonous assem-
blage, was introduced in evidence. Objection was made that this "was a
matter of verbal description, not of description by drawing." Lord Ellen-
gorough, in admitting the sketch, commented: "Can there be any objection
to the production of a drawing, or a model, as illustrative of evidence?
Surely there is nothing in the objection."5
The leading medicolegal case in which demonstrative evidence proved
decisive was the celebrated Webster Case.0 Of all such evidence used by the
prosecution in this trial, the mold of Dr. Parkman's jaw made at the time
he had been fitted with artificial dentures three years previously coupled
with the teeth spared by the furnace fire is conceded to be the conclusive
proof which convicted Professor Webster.7 A few years later, diagrams of
the microscopic appearance of blood were used in State v. Knight s to il-
lustrate technical testimony difficult to project verbally.9
Today, the re-emphasis on real evidence as contrasted to testimonial
evidence is being paralleled by increased scientific interest in what is more
generally spoken of as "non-verbal communication." Our whole society,
in an age of television, movies, and picture-books, is moving away from
purely verbal modes of persuasion. Lawyers, alert to the times, are properly
4. Case of James Watson, the elder, Surgeon, on an Indictment charging
him with High Treason, 32 How. ST. TR. 1 (1817).
5. Id., at 125.
6. Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711 (1850); 4
American State Trials 93 (Lawson ed. 1915).
7. "This last piece of evidence was conclusive against the prisoner, and he
was convicted. Without this closing proof the evidence would certainly have been
unsatisfactory." PHILLIPS, FAMOUS CASES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 47, 49
(1904). See also Williams v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 28, 27 S.W.2d 233 (1930).
8. 43 Me. 11 (1857). In approving this demonstrative evidence, Chief Justice
Tenney stated: "Nothing short of an exact representation to the sight can give
with certainty, a perfectly correct idea to the mind. The witness was permitted to
present the diagrams, merely to explain his meaning, and not as an infallible test
of truth. A diagram approximating in any degree to perfect representation, when
exhibited by one qualified from knowledge and experience to give explanations, may
do much to make clear his testimony, without danger of misleading." Id., at 132.
9. Similar evidentiary exhibits have received judicial approval since. In Mis-
souri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Heacker, 168 S.W. 26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914), a
photomicrograph of a urine specimen and a perimeter tracing were admitted. See
Scott, Medicolegal Photography, 18 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 173, 224 (1946). But cf.
Comment, Preconditions for Admission of Demonstrative Evidence, 61 Nw. U. L.
Rav. 472, 486 (1966). See also Lefstein, Medical Demonstrative Evidence in Illinois,
52 ILL. B. J. 748 (1964) (Annual Abraham Lincoln Award article).
10. Cf RUESH AND KEES, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION (1956). See generally
Probert, Courtroom Semantics 5 Am. Jur. Trials 695 (1966).
[Vol. 32
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stressing non-verbal approaches11 as supplements to traditional verbal per-
suasion of juries and judges.12
Scholarly analysis of the sometimes nebulous concept of demonstrative
evidence has resulted in several technical distinctions whose ramifications
are beyond the scope of this article.'3 Suffice it to say that esoteric as these
11. For debate on the broader social issue posed by modem usage of demon-
strative evidence in the courtroom, see Demonstrative Evidence: Weapon of the
Modern Trial Lawyer or Tool of the Gadgeteer?; O'Connor, The Indictment; Karlin,The Defense, 44 ILL. B. J. 870 (1956). Recently, legal ethics enter the discussion.
Lanham, The Propriety of Demonstrative Evidence when Exploited by Trial Law-
yers, 18 ALA. L. Rv. 447 (1966).
Although most attention centers on "visual appear," one should realize thatdramatic appeal to the other senses is available. "Odor testimony" has been usedin Texas with telling effect. Western Cottonoil Co. v. Adkisson, 276 S.W.2d 411(Tex. Civ. App. 1955); and Western Cottonoil v. Pinkston, 279 S.W.2d 150 (TeM.Civ. App. 1955). Tabor notes the pungency of dung in one of the very early cases.Tabor, Demonstrative Evidence, 29 J. B. A. KAN. 250 (1961). See Flannigan v.
City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962).
For those who fear that today's courtroom is being turned into a "chamber
of horrors" reference should be made to a murder case tried in New Jersey about
1890:
The defense was that the deceased fractured his skull by a fallduring the altercation. To prove that this was probable, Dr. Andress was
called as an expert. He had a large package which he fondly handled, and
while telling his story, unwrapped. He said that on January 9 he visitedNew York, and procured a head taken fresh from the body of a man sixty
years old. Returning to Sparta, he fastened it on an apparatus resembling
a human body, the whole weighing about ninety pounds. This wasdropped from a forty-five degree angle, the skull striking a round stone.It was fractured worse than that of Morris, although he weighed one hun-dred and eighty pounds. The prosecution was so surprised they forgot to
object; and before anyone knew what was coming, the shrunken and ghastly
trophy of medical experiment rolled on the floor. The effect was electrical.
Women shrieked, men shrunk backward, and the court turned pale. One
woman fainted, and for a few moments the room was filled with uproar, thepersons in the rear striving to get a view, while those in front retreated
from the grinning skull .... Browne, Practical Tests in Evidence VIII.,
5 GREEN BAG 268, 270-271 (1893).For applications dealing with the larger problems of international boundaries
see Hyde, Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes, 27 AM. J. INT'L L.311 (1927). Gilbert T. Adams and J. Melvin Franks of the Beaumont, Texas Barhave reported extensive use of demonstrative evidence in boundary disputes. A
typical usage is the offer of chunks of wood from trees in conjunction with expert
testimony of woodsmen on tree-age. In Kirby Lumber Corporation v. Smith, 305S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), a crucial issue was the length of time a certainfence had been in existence. The fence was nailed to a growing tree, and chunks
were cut from the trees at the point where the wires were attached, the chunksbeing admitted in evidence on the question of whether or not the fence had been inplace over ten years.
12. Actually, demonstrative evidence is mostly used outside the courtroom,
especially in civil cases, as trial men and claimsmen seek fair compromise as well asthorough pre-trial preparation of their medicolegal cases. SINDELL AND SNDELT,
LET's TALK SrriEMENr 328 et seq. (1963); Hinshaw, Preparation for Trial-
Demonstrative Evidence, 1953 PROC: SEC. INSUR. L., A.B.A. 174.
13. Wigmore's division into "Autoptic Proference" and "Non-Verbal Expres-
sion" is one; note that he recognizes.an overlap of the cases, 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
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distinctions may seem to the practitioner, some are carried into judicial
interpretations of the law of evidence.' 4
Helpful as demonstrative evidence may be, its use is frequently open
to objection on at least one of several possible grounds. Both the proponent
and opponent must be instantly prepared in court to challenge 5 or justify 6
this manner of presentation.17 It is because of this necessity that the
172-73 n. 2 (3d ed. 1940); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE 254 n. 3 (3d ed. 1940). Gardner
has drawn the distinction in terms of "demonstrative" as opposed to the "weaker"
illustrative evidence, citing Gulson's "immediate" as contrasted to "transmitted"
evidence. Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N. C. L. REv. 233, 236, 239
(1946). McKelvey devotes separate chapters to "Pictoral Evidence" (chapter 15)
and to "Writings" (chapter 14). McKELvEY, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1944). McCormick
indicates that some of these distinctions may well be unsound. McCoRMrcK, Evi-
DENCE 388 (1954).
14. For example, Texas cases have followed the distinction between "sub-
stantive" (demonstrative, immediate) and "illustrative" (pictoral, visual aid)
evidence as concerns plats. Such plats, offered as "independent evidence" have been
excluded when not authenticated by the surveyor who made the plat. Smith v.
Bunch, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 541, 73 S.W. 559, 562 (1903).
Scott singles out photographs as distinct from hand-drawn maps and diagrams
and argues that (1) since jurymen are apt to think a photograph is an absolute
mirror, slight distortions in photographs justify exclusion; (2) since photography,
and more especially color photography, produces a result more life-like than an
inanimate drawing, there is increased danger of prejudicially inciting the jury, and(3) since a photograph is thought of as a "silent eyewitness," it has probative
force beyond its value as an illustration. ScoTT, PHoToRAPlc EvMENCE 1001
(2d ed. 1967).
15. Delay in objection may result in waiver. State v. Anderson, 384 S.W.2d
591, 606 (Mo. 1964); Alvey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 360 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. 1962).
16. "About five years ago, I recommended that lawyers follow a suggestion
made by Melvin Belli. See Gordon, Demonstrative Evidence, Past, Present and
Future, 32 Wis. BAR BULL. No. 1 pp 11, 22 (February, 1959). I refer to his proposal
that when an attorney plans to use a novel form of presentation of evidence, he
should give a full explanation of what is planned to the judge in chambers. The
reference was to the use of demonstrative evidence, but I think the suggestion has
general application and would apply to most forms of scientific evidence as well.
I know that in the urgency of a trial, a judge is often forced to make snap decisions
which might not have been made if he had had more time for quiet reflection on the
proposal in question." Gordon, The Use of Scientific Evidence .and Its Legal Lim-
itations, 9 J. FoR. Sci. 301, 310-311 (1964).
17. Though the remainder of the text will be in terms of exhibits "marked
in evidence" the force of body exhibition in court should not be overlooked. See
generally, Spangenberg, The Use of Demonstrative Evidence, 21 OHIo ST. L. J. 178
(1960). See also North v. Williams, 366 P.2d 406, 408 (1961) (after handling plain-
tiff's digit, a juror exclaimed: "her thumb's ruirnt.") Compare Green v. Boney,
233 S. C. 49, 103 S.E.2d 732 (1958) (plaintiff walking before jury) with a display
before English appellate judges:
Kansas City Star, July 2, 1966, p. 9, col. 3
A Pretty Girl Suffers Loss In Leg Show.
London (AP)-The three bewigged judges in the court of appeal
asked pretty 17-year-old Elizabeth Gough to parade before them so they
could see the way her hips swing.
And then the presiding judge, Lord Denning, asked her:
"Could I just see your right leg?"
Elizabeth obliged-and apparently too impressively for her own good.
[Vol. 32
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possible objections are here broadly catalogued into three groups, and the
most common objections urged in practice are set forth.
I. "GROUNDLESS" OBJECTIONS
These are, generally speaking, objections that are not well directed
at the particular problems raised by the offer of demonstrative evidence.
Though usually unsuccessful they are sometimes urged for tactical reasons.
In any event it is usually advisable for counsel to shift to other grounds
in his attack on the matter offered.
A. Not Instructive
Although a line of Massachusetts cases' s established as a criterion of
admission the "practical instructiveness" of an exhibit, it is suggested
that this is merely a clich6 and so misses the mark."9 The preferable test
asks whether the matter is offered "for the purpose of enabling the jury
to better understand and apply the evidence." 20 Considerations of ma-
teriality2 ' and relevancy 22 hold the key to admissibility rather than con-
siderations of "instructiveness."
B. Not "Best Evidence"
This objection to demonstrative evidence-as contrasted to the nar-
rower "documentary evidence"-is not in point, for ". . . only documents or
The judges yesterday cut from $7,000 to $4,200 the damages she had
been awarded in a lower court for a highway accident.
Elizabeth was knocked own by a car in 1962. Her right leg was
broken and is now an inch and a quarter shorter.
Lord Denning said the judge who made the award in the lower court
was much too pessimistic about the girl's future.
Elizabeth said later of her exhibition in court:
"It was not too embarrassing. The judges were quite nice."
18. 3 WwIoRE, EvIDENcE 185 (3d ed. 1940). See also Goldner and Mrovka,
Demonstrative Evidence and Audio-Visnal Aids at Triai, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 185,(1955).
19. Regardless of the informative value of an exhibit, the cases actually deal
with the problem of cumulative testimony; Wilcox v. Forbes, 173 Mass. 63, 53
N.E. 146 (1899); or the tendency of the exhibit to "mislead," Carey v. Town of
Hubbardston, 172 Mass. 106, 51 N.E. 521 (1898).
20. Roderiquez v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 259, 22 S.W. 978 (1893), emphasis
supplied.
21. [T]he inclusion of certain questions or propositions within the range of
allowable controversy in the lawsuit." McCoMicK, EvIDENCE 315 (1954).
22. [T]he tendency of the evidence to establish a material proposition."
See Thomson and Leittem, Evidence Admissibility-One Simple Test, 31 Mo. L.
Rxv. 17 (1966); Thomson and Leittem, Evidence Admsisibility-Tte Common De-
nmnator, 31 Mo. L. Ray. 516 (1966).
Commissioner Holman, commenting on a "faint movie" in Wren v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 333 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1960), apparently places admissibility on the
ground of relevance though the film was characterized as "instructive."
5
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things bearing writing, can be within the purview of this rule. ' 23 Thus, a
Texas trial judge who forbade the use of a skeleton because it did not com-
prise the very bones of the plaintiff seated at counsel table on a "best evi-
dence" theory was not following orthodox rules of evidence!
C. "Hearsay!"
Unsuccessfully forwarded as an objection in the Richardson case,24 this
ground is without merit. In reply to the argument that one "cannot crcss-
examine a picture (or other object)," it should be noted that the material
offered is part of, and is used in conjunction with, testimony of a witness
who is subject to cross-examination. 25
II. VErTY oR CoRucmEss
A. Lack of Avthentication
Failure to establish a proper predicate for introduction of demonstra-
tive evidence is ground for reversal.2 6 This preliminary showing usually
takes the form of "identifying" the particular matter to be exhibited by a
witness.27 In addition, the witness must verify the correctness of the por-
trayal.28 It is not essential that the authenticating witness have actually
prepared the photograph, map, drawing, or other exhibit,2 9 nor is it essential
that he be the custodian of evidentiary items such as bullets, bodily re-
mains, auto parts, and clothing.30 As an example, in Gibson v. State,81 the
following objection was made:
23. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1181, 320 (3d ed. 1940).
24. Richardson v. Missouri-K. T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) error dismissed.
25. Wigmore disposes of this objection well. 3 WIGMoRE, EVYIENCE § 791 (4),
178; 5 WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1385, 79-81. But a verbal report of tests can be ob-
jectional hearsay. Mehochko v. Gold Seal Co., 66 Ill. App.2d 54, 213 N.E.2d 581
(1966). Compare Savoia v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 88 N.J. Super. 153, 211 A.2d
214 (1965).
26. Jarbet Co. v. Hengst, 260 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Tallabas v.
Wing Chong, 72 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). What if an accomplice authen-
ticates a movie of a crime in progress? See People v. Bowley, 26 Cal. Rptr. 435
1962), rev'd., 59 Cal.2d 855, 31 CaL Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591 (1963), Noted, 62
Micu. L. REv. 1259 (1964).
27. Williams v. State, 298 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956) (less than posi-
tive identification of cap).
28. Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 153 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941),
error dism'd. Fox v. City of Kansas City, 343 S.W.2d 200 (K.C. Ct. App. 1960)
(Judge Cross sustained exclusion of night photos when witnesses could not verify).
Cf., Breshears v. Union Electric Company, 373 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1964).
29. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Magee, 49 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1899), error refused; Williams v. Altruda, 74 R.I. 441, 58 A.2d 562 (1948).
30. Lestico v. Kuener, 204 Minn. 125, 283 N.W. 122 (1938); Pasadena Re-
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No proper predicate has been lain to introduce the photo-
graphs in evidence, since their authenticity had not been properly
shown and established; the witness . . .'called by the State to
identify and vouch for the authenticity of the photographs, said
that he did not take the photographs, that he did not develop the
photographs from their negatives, and he did not say that he was
present when they were developed and printed by the photographer
who was alleged to have made the photographs.
This was overcome by testimony of the witness that he was present when
the pictures were taken, that he had superintended the taking of the photos,
and that they were correct representations of the deceased's body.32
Procedurally, counsel would do well to review the "five steps" ordi-
narily necessary in verifying demonstrative evidence. Scott summarizes
these in connection with photographs and similar procedure is customarily
employed with other demonstrative evidence as well.33
1. Call the verifying witness to the stand. Set the background for the
witness' testimony. That is, let the judge and jury know why the witness
is in court. Is he the photographer? Is he the technician who took the x-
rays? Was he at the scene? Is he familiar with Blank's medical charts?
Does he use these charts in teaching his own classes? The answer to this
basic "why?" inquiry, should be further developed by like queries.
2. Hand the picture to the court reporter and request that it be
marked as an exhibit for identification. A widely circulated medicolegal
teaching film, "The Medical Witness,134 neglects to emphasize this essential
step.3 6
31. 153 Tex. Crim. 582, 223 S.W.2d 625 (1949).
32. Id. at 587, 223 S.W.2d at 629.
33. Scorr, PHoToGRAPHiC EvIDENCE § 1451 (2d ed. 1967). Judge Morrison,
in McFarlane v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 658, 266 S.W.2d 133 (1954), quoted the
Honorable Jack Pope's article, The Presentation of Scientific Evidence, 31 TEx. L.
REv. 794, 797 (1953):
Perhaps the simplest predicate is that required for photographs.
"Is this photograph a fair and accurate representation of (the subject
of the inquiry) as it existed on the day in question?"
That simple question is the modest predicate necessary in most juris-
dictions for an ordinary photograph of a still object The question pre-
supposes, however, that the witness is familiar with the scene. Generally
speaking, the photographer need not be produced, and any person
familiar with the scene will suffice.
See also Busch, Photographs--Still, Motion and X-Ray, 44 ILL. B. J. 168 (1955).
For the proper procedure with x-rays see Scott, X-Ray Pictures as Evidence, 44.
Micn. L. Rrv. 773, 791 (1946). Compare Pettus v. Dubman, 389 S.W.2d 373, 376-
377 (St. L. Ct. App. 1965).
34. Produced by the Win. S. Merrill Co. and available for bar and medical
groups through the ABA and the AMA offices, Chicago.
35. Although perhaps perfunctory as a technical matter, trial strategists capi-
talize on this opportunity to let the jury know that the matter being "officially
marked" is "something special."
7
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3. Show the photograph to the opposing counsel and the court. It is
at this stage that opposing counsel should analyze carefully the evidence in
light of the strategy of the case and determine if there are objections that
should be advanced.3 6
4. Lay the Foundation by testimony that the picture is a fair repre-
sentation of the subject.87
5. Offer the exhibit in evidence. 8s
B. Incorrect Representation
A protest that an exhibit is not a fair representation is probably the
strongest objection to be leveled at demonstrative evidence. Because of the
risks of a general objection 9 counsel should normally follow up by pointing
36. "No objection!" may be the best way to combat the exhibit. See Pier-
son, Combating tke Use of Demonstrative Evidence, 1956 Paoc. SEC. INS. L., ABA
430.
37. Scott has deliberately replaced the expression "accurate representation"
with "fair representation" in his second edition. SCOTT, op. cit. supra, note 33, §
1451. State v. Sanders, 365 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Mo. 1963). Of course, maps, plats,
diagrams and the like may be represented as being less than exact. A crude sketch
erroneous in details, was held properly admitted since no harm resulted to the
opponent in Banker v. McLaughlin, 200 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), af'd,
146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843, 8 A.L.R.2d 1231 (1948). But exclusion of a sketch,
shown not to be a full and complete survey, was held proper in Ayres v. Patton,
111 S.W. 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
38. Standard medical and other scientific charts are admissible in evidence.
A muscle chart was apparently employed in St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Reich-
ert, 227 S.W. 550, 555 (Tex. City App. 1921), the court holding that the "pic-
ture of the muscles described by the physicians, which they testified was correct, was
admissible as a part of such description and practically became a part of their testi-
mony." On the other hand, proponent is not required to introduce the chart in
evidence when used to illustrate testimony. Stedman Fruit Co. v. Smith, 28 S.W.2d
622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). Consequently, counsel that frequently re-use standard
charts in the court room are wont to refrain from formally offering such exhibits.
See Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784, 793 (Mo. 1959).
39. See Ball, Objections to Evidence, 15 ARK. L. Rav. 69, 71 (1960-61), quot-
ing Judge Lamm's famous language in Bragg v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 92 Mo.
331, 91 S.W. 527 (1905); Monson v. State, 2 Tex. Crim. 925, 63 S.W. 647, 649
(1901); Monson v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 426, 76 S.W. 570 (1903). The need to
"preserve the record" is pointed out in Young v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 207, 213, 92
S.W. 841, 843 (1906) (photographs of deceased after autopsy: "(I)n the...
bill . .. presented to us there is nothing therein showing that the same were not
correct photographs, except appellant's objections."); and in Bullock v. State, '73
Tex. Crim. 419, 424, 165 S.W. 196, 199 (1914) (map or plat, not to scale, drawn by
civil engineer, was introduced without objection; later, after a number of witnesses
had used the map in conjunction with their testimony, "(a)ppellant objected to
this in a general way, because the map was not correct, misleading, and calculated
to lead said witness into making statements which sustained the state's theory
in some particulars." Held, properly overruled.)
More recently, Judge Leedy properly concluded that the words "I object
strenuously to introduction of these photographs" was no objection at all. State
v. Washington, 368 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Mo. 1963).
[Vol. 32
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out particular inaccuracies.40 The following objections are variations on this
central theme.
1. Distortion. When a proponent offers an exhibit as a true and cor-
rect representation and in fact it is not, the court has discretionary power
to refuse its admission.4 ' On the other hand, courts have shown a disposi-
tion to hold that such objection goes merely to the weight of the evidence
and not to its admissibility.42 Consequently, the objection may be over-
ruled and the complaining party then be entitled to a precautionary in-
struction. 43 He can, of course, expose the distortion on cross-examination
or as part of his affirmative case.44
2. InJury exaggerated. In an unreported Texas case,45 "The defendant
being indicted for aggravated assault by biting off a piece of the com-
plainant's ear, the complainant was permitted to exhibit the maimed ear
to the jury." In exhibiting such a "gaping wound of Caesar"46 or photo-
40. It is at this juncture that the technical acumen of the advocate is crucial.
The mandatory background text is Scorr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1967).
See also the debate: Heilpem and Schatz, Responsibilities of the Legal Profession to
Forensic Sciences: Responsibilities to the Courtroom Photographer, 6 J. FOR Sci.
207 (1961); Tuttle and Conrad, Photographs as a Mode of Communicating Testi-
mony, 7 J. FOR. Sci. 82 (1962). An address to the Medico-:Legal Society by Dr.
P. N. Cardew, "Truth and Deception in Photography" led to the conclusion that
medicolegal experts in England rely less than formerly on photographic evidence
in forensic practice. Noted, 29 MErnco-LEGA. J. 50 (1961).
41. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Worthy, 9 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928); cf. Taylor v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. 347, 197 S.W. 196 (1917).
42. Jackson-Strickland Transp. Co. v. Seyler, 123 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938, "dis'd agr."); Dofner v. Branard, 236 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951,
"error ref'd n.r.e."). See Comment, Demonstrative Evidence in Iowa, 10 DRAKE L.
REV. 44 (1960). Also, the appellate court may hold that introduction of an inac-
curate exhibit was harmless error. Besson v. Richards, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 64, 58
S.W. 611 (1900).
43. In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Magee, 49 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1899) (error ref'd), the trial court had admitted a photograph but had in-
structed the jury to disregard the part distorted. The Texas appellate court con-
sidered this a proper method of limiting the ruling on admissibility. See Scorr,
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1565 (2d ed. 1967).
44. Carter v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 345, 46 S.W. 236, 237 (1898), rehearing de-
nied, 39 Tex. Crim. 345, 352, 48 S.W. 508 (1899), rev'd on fed. question, 177 U.S.
442 (1900), "If the map was not a correct one, this fact could be shown; and the
defendant, if he desired, could attack the map by showing its incorrectness, and
supply the defects by putting in evidence one of his own." Davis v. Illinois
Terminal R. R. Co., 326 S.W.2d 78, 86-87 (Mo. 1959) (counsel's lack of information
on night photography at trial time could not found a valid plea of newly discovered
evidence on motion for new trial). Brockman v. State, 163 Neb. 171, 79 N.W.2d 9,
14-15 (1956) (appearance photos of rape victim; defense counsel not permitted to
attack admission in evidence by expert testimony when police officer during authen-
tication admitted color transparencies were not exact reproductions, such expert
testimony being allowed only as part of the defendant's case.)
45. Browne, Practical Tests in Evidence, II, 4 GREEN BAG 555 (1892).
46. Ibid., "In his brief in People v. Kelly, 94 N.Y. 526 (1884), Mr. John H.
McKinley said: 'No gaping wound of Caesar can be used in this age to conflict the
inflictor.' But the court held otherwise."
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graphs of such a wound, how far can the proponent go in emphasizing the
character of the wound?
The line was crossed in People v. Burns47 with
Pictures of the face, neck, and torso taken after the autopsy.
They were particularly horrible because the head was completely
shaved. The head shows large incisions which had been made for
the autopsy and were thereafter sewn together. In two pictures the
lips were practically turned inside out and held with instruments
to show the cuts. Both arms showed marks or punctures made by
the surgeon, one being particularly ugly .... The completely bald
head, the surgical cuts and sutures, the ugly punctures, the in-
verted lips with instruments attached, make the body so grotesque
and horrible that it is doubtful if the average juror could be per-
suaded to look at the picture while the witness pointed out the
bruises and abrasions.48
On the other hand, in an Arizona case,49 the court indicated that since
it was entirely proper for the jury to have examined the head of deceased,
if that were possible, there was no error in admitting photographs. The
court, in commenting on a photograph similar to that of the Burns case,
stated that "the fact that the ghastly appearance of the wounds, even
though such appearance was heightened by the shaving of the head and
the use of mercurochrome ... did not make (the photographs) inadmissi-
ble... ." 0 Similarly, in People v. Elmorer" a death was admittedly caused
by a knife wound.
Two photographs of Polio's neck, taken shortly after his death,
were received in evidence for the purpose of showing the size and
character of the wound inflicted upon him. In one of these the
cut appeared as it was sewed up prior to his death; in the other
the stitches had been removed and the edges of the cut were held
apart by two short sticks inserted for the purpose, thus disclosing
the incision of the windpipe made by the wound. 2
47. 109 Cal. App. 2d 524, 241 P.2d 308 (1952), hearing denied, 242 P.2d 9(1952).
48. Id., 241 P.2d at 318-319. Followed in People v. Redston, 139 Cal. App. 2d
485, 293 P.2d 880, 883-884 (1956).
49. Young v. State, 38 Ariz. 298, 299 P. 682 (1931).50. Id. at 306, 299 P.2d at 685. More recently the same court has held itproper to admit photographs of wounds "in better condition" than at the time of
the injury. State v. Lee, 80 Ariz. 213, 295 P.2d 380 (1956).
51. 167 Cal. 205, 138 P. 989 (1914).
52. Id. at 212, 138 P. at 991. See also People v. Reese, 27 Cal. 2d 112, 301
P.2d 582 (1956), a rape-murder case in which photographs of the victim, showing
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3. Injury and Background Not in Natural Color. A landmark case in
Missouri is Faughkt v. Washam. 3 Although close reading, attention to later
explanatory authority,53a and personal "grapevine reports"54 should be
indulged, it can be concluded that had a more scientific foundation been
laid for the offer of color photography, reversal for a lack of natural color
would not have resulted.55 Special Judge Stone's declaration on this limited
point is sui generis:
As for the six colored [sic]5 6 photographs in the instant case, we
have had sufficient familiarity with male limbs to know that the
limbs shown in these photographs are not portrayed in their %at-
ural color (and certainly the same is true with respect to their
backgrounds), and we have had sufficient experience in trial prac-
tice (inept as we may have been in that field) to perceive the
probable inflammatory impact of such photographs depicting sym-
pathy-provoking injuries in "high and unrealistic colors."5''
Professor Conrad, pointing out that courts had been liberal in admitting
colored photographs or diagrams before the advent of color photography,58
stresses that color photographs more nearly portray reality even if there
are slight deviations from "true color values": 9
Now we have used black and white photographs for so long
that we accept them as the real thing. Actually, black and white
photography is considered an abstract medium and does not rep-
resent reality as such....
The inherent realism of color photography has been urged, un-
successfully, as a reason for rejecting black and white photographs
53. 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).
53a. Boydston v. Burton, 379 S.W.2d 536, 542 (Mo. 1964); Gooch v. Avsco,
Inc., 337 S.W. 2d 245, 252 (Mo. 1960).
54. At least one experienced trial lawyer who examined the exhibits admitted
that the photos "went too far" even though his personal predilections favor admis-
sion of color photographs. See also, Reed v. Shelly, 378 S.W.2d 291, 302 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1964) (per J. Hogan).
55. The opinion notes that a photographer had "identified" the photographs
on a previous trial when the exhibits were excluded. Also, the medical evidence was
"meager." Implied is that a stronger foundation, perhaps with the aid of a medical
photographer, might have saved the day. Compare Johnson v. Clement F. Sculley
Const. Co., 255 Minn. 41, 95 N.W.2d 409 (1959), Floen v. Sund, 255 Minn. 211,
96 N.W.2d 563 (1959).
56. See ScoTr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1351 (2d ed. 1967).
57. Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d at 600.
58. Conrad, Evidential Aspect of Color Photography, 4 J. FoR. Scl. 176, 178
(1959); see also, Blawie, Color Photography: A Memorandum on AddisibiliXty in
Evidence, 28 CONN. B. J. 301 (1954).
59. See also, Sconr, PHOTOGRAPHic EVIDENCE § 751 (2d ed. 1967).
60. Conrad, supra note 58, at 177-178.
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of the same subject [citing cases]. When color films become the
accepted standard of photography, it is conceivable that the courts
will sustain objections to black and white photographs lacking the
realism of color pictures.60
4. Exhibit Retouched or Marked. The fact that a photograph is re-
touched is not enough to justify its exclusion."- Emphasizing marks placed
on an exhibit do not necessarily render it inadmissible.62 In State v.
Weston,63 plaster casts of the areas of a body wounded by gun-shot were
prepared prior to autopsy. Upon these casts were numerous small blue dots
placed by a witness comparing the casts with the body at the morgue for
the purpose of distinguishing the shot wounds from air bubbles in the
casts. One ground of objection was that "after the blue dots which indicate
the wounds had been placed upon the cast it was no longer . .. a true
representation of deceased's forearm and hand." 64 Stating that an exact
duplicate of "flesh and bone" is not required, Justice Rossman declared:
The jury was amply informed that the sole purpose of the blue
dots was to indicate the presence of the wounds. Since the jurors
could rightfully look at the indications of the wounds, we cannot
understand how the help which these small dots gave them in lo-
cating the wounds could have prejudiced any interest properly
claimed by the defendant ...
(W)e deduce the rule that maps, photographs et cetera, con-
taining markings, are not inadmissible if they are otherwise rel-
evant and if the individual who made the mark or wrote the legend
was familiar with the facts and so testifies, or if some other wit-
ness, familiar with the facts, adopts the mark or legend as his
own.G5
5. Misleading, Confusing, or Too Suggestive. This language is often in-
corporated in objections dealing with many forms of demonstrative evi-
dence. 68 There are three situations, however, in which this tenor of ob-
jection is especially important.
61. Scorr, PHOTOGRAPHic EvDENcE § 1050 (2d ed. 1967).
62. Id. at § 1484. Busch believes the better practice is to offer photographs
free of such markings. Busch, Photographic Evidene, 4 DE PA UL L. Rav. 195, 196(1955).
63. 155 Ore. 556, 64 P.2d 536 (1937); Skipworth, Admission of Photographs
in Evidence in Homicide Cases, 15 ORE. L. Rav. 254 (1936).
64. Id. at 563, 64 P.2d at 541.
65. Id. at 571, 574, 64 P.2d at 542-43.
66. For example, State v. Thomas, 78 Ariz. 52, 275 P.2d 408 (1954) (picture
of a body taken prior to autopsy; burnt clothing had been taken from wounds and
[Vol. 32
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First, an objection to a scale model offered in evidence has been sus-
tained on this ground.6 7 'Tile models may frequently be of great assist-
ance to a court and jury, it is common knowledge that, even when con-
structed to scale, they may frequently, because of the great disparity in
size between the model and the original, also be very misleading .... ,8
Second are objections to posed photographs or movie re-enactments.
The dangers of deception are substantial enough to result in a split of au-
thority among different jurisdictions.8 9 A leading authority is Richardson v.
Missouri-K. T. R. Co. of Texas,70 a F.E.L.A. case in which the jury found
damages of $6,000 but cut it in half on account of plaintiff's own negligence.
To establish plaintiff's negligence, defendant introduced a color motion
picture that showed the shop foreman demonstrating how the plaintiff's
hand "could be caught and run through the blades" of a shaping machine.
The foreman testified, however, that "he did not know how the fingers of
appellant were caught in the machine and therefore his experiments did
not undertake to show how appellant was operating it at the time."7 1 The
court thrust aside plaintiff's objections and his plea that by the use of such
skillfully technical picture, the appellee took from the appellant the sum
of $3,000.W 2 "In the final analysis, the increased danger of fraud peculiar to
posed photographs must be weighed against their communicative value.
Only the additional danger of fraud or suggestion separates this question
from that of the admissibility of ordinary photographs. '73 This danger of
fraud and suggestion is no doubt at work when judges have excluded
"certain photographs which were taken during the period when plaintiff was
opponent claimed photographs consequently misleading; held, properly admitted.)
Ortiz v. State, 30 Fla. 256, 267, 11 So. 611, 613 (1892) (photograph taken from
distorting angle properly excluded; it "could have been of no assistance to thejury in the case, but would have served as an agency of confusion.")
67. San Mateo County v. Christen, 22 Cal. App.2d 375, 71 P.2d 88 (1937).
68. Id. at 378, 71 P.2d at 89. But see, Church v. Headrick & Brown, 101 Cal.
App.2d 396, 255 P.2d 558 (1950) (same court; use of scale model approved).
69. 19 A.L.R.2d 877 (1951),-27 A.L.R. 913 (1923). See Paradis, The Celuloid
Witness, 37 COLO. L. REV. 235 (1965). Cf. Comment, Posed Photographs: Adinissi-
bility, 3 DuKE B. J. 61 (1952). See also, Oglesby v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 338
S.W.2d 357 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960); PousT, DEmONSTRATIONs DURING TRIAL, 10
TRIAL LAwymt's GUIDE 319 (1966).
70. 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
71. Id. at 822-823.
72. Id. at 820; WIGMOmE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICUAL PROOF § 282 (3d ed.
1937).
73. Comment, supra note 69, at 64. See, Anello v. Southern Pacific Co., 174
Cal. App.2d 317, 344 P.2d 843 (1959).
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being treated for his injuries and which showed his face distorted with
pain."74.
The third category comprises comparison exhibits. This not only in-
volves comparison of bodily parts of an injured party with a witness with
similar injuries, but also brings into the arena comparison photographs and
x-rays. Although it is a common and approved practice to introduce
"normal" x-rays for comparison with x-rays of the injured party,75 there
is authority that though such x-rays were "proper subject matter for jury
consideration," exclusion by the trial court was not an abuse of discretion."
Other cases deciding whether an exhibit is "misleading,"7 7 serves as
"an agent of confusion,"78 or "injects .. . an issue foreign to the matter
under inquiry" 79 are also best listed under this general heading.
III. UNDUE PREjUmcE
Even though proffered demonstrative evidence passes the test of
verity with flying colors, still a large hurdle remains-judicial discretion.
Even though an exhibit be perfectly accurate, the trial judge has discretion
to exclude demonstrative evidence that may create undue prejudice in the
minds of the tribunal-such "sympathy,"8 0 "distraction,"81 "resentment,"82
74. Hrabak v. Madison Gas and Electric Co., 240 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir.
1957). Compare, Intermill v. Hewmesser, 154 Colo. 496, 391 P.2d 684 (1964);
Glowacki v. Holste, 295 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1956).
75. Scott, X-Ray Pictures as Evidence, 44 MicH. L. REv. 773,791 (1946).
76. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Hale, 188 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945), aff'd, 144 Tex. 432, 191 S.W.2d 472 (1946). Compare, Cunningham v. Ogre-
sovich, 110 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ohio App. 1951).
77. State v. Thomas, supra note 66.
78. Ortiz v. State, supra note 66.
79. Moss v. May Department Stores Co., 31 S.W.2d 566, 567 (St. L. Ct. App.
1930).
80. "[T]he jury may heedlessly conclude.., that since the plaintiff is truly
in a pitiable plight, some one at least should be found to compensate him, and the
defendant rather than any one else... " 4 WiwoRE, EVIDENCE § 1158 (3d ed.
1940). In a leading Missouri case, plaintiff's counsel had an expert witness demon-
strate the surgical procedures of a laminectomy by flourishing a scalpel before thejury. The court upheld the defendant's contention that there was no controverted
fact issue concerning the laminectomy and that the "purpose of the demonstration
was to arouse the sympathy of the jury . . ." Taylor v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co.,
364 Mo. 693, 699, 266 S.W.2d 732, 736 (1954) (triaL court reversed). Accord, Kick-
ham v. Carter, 314 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1958); Fitzpatrick v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co.,
327 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1959). Compare, Hampton v. RauterstFauch, 338 S.W.2d
105 (Mo. 1960); 83 A.L.R. 2d 1260 (1962).
81. Willis v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 139, 146, 90 S.W. 1100, 1104 (1905) (large
photograph of sister of defendant excluded; "introduction of the picture of a beau-
tiful woman . . . and the fact that appellant was accustomed to visit her picture
and brood over it, would be a matter calculated to distract the attention of thejury from the main issues of the case.")
82. Ray v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 12, 16-17, 266 S.W.2d 124, 127 (1954) (Ob-
[Vol. 32
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"repulsion,83 or "indignation"8 4 that overcomes the rational processes of
the trier of fact. 5 The ambit of judicial discretion here tends to be nar-
row; "[W]hen the balance waivers the court should lean toward admis-
sion."" Wigmore compares criminal and civil cases and concludes that the
risks of unfair prejudice are of greater frequency in personal injury cases
and so implies that the trial court should exercise discretion to exclude
more firmly in civil than in criminal cases.8 7 In any event, the court's dis-
cretion is to "prevent abuse" of demonstrative evidence.88
A. Inflam'nutory
Perhaps the most common objection directed toward exercise of judicial
discretion to exclude is that the matter offered is inflammatory. Photo-
graphs of corpses in criminal and wrongful death cases are most often con-
sidered in the reports. A leading Texas case, Alcorta v. State,"9 indicated
jection that two close-up photographs of the head, neck, and shoulders of a five
year old retarded child and a full-length view of his nude body taken at the funeral
home were "so horrible and revolting as to be readily calculated to arouse resent-
ment against the person guilty." Held, properly admitted as "shedding light" upon
the issues of malice and intent to kill.
83. See cases cited in 4 WiaoOn, EVIDENCE § 1159 n. 3 at p. 262; Knowles v.
Crampton, 55 Conn. 336, 11 A. 593 (1887) (section of cadaver offered to demon-
strate character of rib and breast-bone formation, excluded.); Commonwealth v.
Morgan, 358 Pa. 607, 58 A.2d 330 (1948) (demonstration of rape held prejudicial).
But note Judge Learned Hand's comment that in personal injury suits "the very
hideousness of the deformity was a part of the suffering of the victim, and could
not rationally be excluded in the assessment of his damages." Slattery v. Marra
Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951).
84. State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13, 29-30 (1877) ("[E]xhibition to the jury of
the bones of the vertebral column of the deceased . .. served to show the jury the
attitudes and relative positions of the parties when the shot was fired. It was not
an unnecessary parade of the bones of the dead man to excite prejudice against his
slayer, but was legitimate and proper evidence, and a party cannot, upon the
ground that it may harrow up feelings of indignation against him in the breasts of
the jury, have competent evidence excluded from their consideration.")
85. See Lee v. Glad, 267 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
86. McComvicK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 386 (1954).
87. 4 WIOmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1157, § 1158 (3d ed. 1940). Note the famous use
by Earl Rogers of the preserved intestines of a deceased to prove a self-defense
theory in a criminal case. CADY AND BER RY, Wound Ballistics in Medicolegal
Cases, TR I LAwi'mR's GuIDE 499 (1957), quoting COHN AND CmHsoLM, TAKE
THE WrNssl 29-31 (1934). See, ST. JOHNS, FINAL VmDicr, 90 (1962); Anderson
v. Seropian, 147 Cal. 201, 81 P. 521 (1905) (preserved hand). Compare, Harper v.
Bolton, 124 S.E.2d 54 (S.C. 1962) (reversible error to admit injured eye preserved
in alcohol).
88. 4 WIGMORE, op cit. supra note 87. Compare the viewpoints of plaintiff and
defense personal injury counsel voiced in ABA confrontations: Demonstrative
Evidence-Its Proper Uses-Its Misuses and Abuses, 1957 PRoc. SEC. INs. NEG.
CoMP. LAw 163 (Deparcq) 170 (Betts); The Proper Role of Demonstrative Evi..
deuce, 1965 PROC. SEC. INS. NEG. COMP. LAW 316 (Peckinpaugh), 318 (Beckham).
89. 294 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S.
28 (1957).
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that there must be a "serious inflammation" to justify reversal. In that case
the state offered five photographs of the deceased's nude body punctured
by thirty-two knife wounds. Since the defendant had admitted the homicide
and had conceded that the knife wounds were causative of the death, it was
earnestly contended that the photographs would tend to prove no issue in
the case and would merely serve to inflame the jury. The majority of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that defendant's denial on cross-
examination that there were thirty-two wounds created an issue of fact
justifying admission of the photographs. In dissent, Judge Davidson com-
mented:
The five pictures showing the nude body of the deceased in
various positions-ghastly . . . horrible, as they are-were highly
inflammatory and calculated to arouse against the perpetrator the
prejudice of those who viewed them. They were clearly calculated
to cause, and did cause, the jury to inflict the death penalty. But
for their introduction in evidence, the jury-in my opinion-would
not have assessed the death penalty.90
Reversal of a manslaughter conviction91 was won in the Missouri Su-
preme Court upon the same objection, the state's attorney admitting that
the photo of a decomposed corpse was "somewhat hideous" and "inflam-
matory." Commissioner Barrett reviewed the authorities and concluded:
The photograph ...was neither needed nor offered for any
of the conventional reasons or purposes,--to identify the victim,
to show the nature and location of the injury, to illustrate or prove
the character of the weapon, the surrounding circumstances, to
determine the degree of the crime, or to show the cause of death.92
As a matter of fact, by the state's admissions, the body was in such
a state of decomposition that most of these matters could not be
found or illustrated,93 particularly by this photograph.9' In short,
90. Id. 294 S.W.2d at 117. Language by Judge Morrison in dealing with
the motion for rehearing suggests that there is a point where pictures of a murder
victim lying in pools of blood, especially if the photographs were in color, might
become prejudicial as inflammatory.
91. State v. Floyd, 360 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. 1962).
92. Counsel had urged admissibility on the ground that the photo explained
the absence of "pathological proof of any cause of death."
93. Adequate medicolegal investigation can often reveal a cause of death in
decomposed bodies. Sir Sydney Smith recounts the solution of such a case in
which he took the deceased's skull into court and demonstrated how a metal file
was "dug up" which fitted a depressed skull fracture. SMrrm, MosTLY MURDER
96 (1959).
94. The offer of the photograph came in conjunction with the testimony of a
deputy sheriff, not that of the coroner, "a doctor of thirty years' experience" who
had testified concerning the cause of death.
[Vol. 32
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as the court said of another photograph in reversing a manslaughter
conviction, this exhibit is "extremely obscene, offensive, vulgar,
horrid, and repulsive," 95 and any relevant probative value it may
have is far outweighted by the fact that it is needlessly and mani-
festly inflammatory and therefore prejudicially erroneous.98
In Southern Transport Co. v. Adams97 the court, reversing on other
grounds, approved use of photographs of the deceased "in so far as they
were pertinent to any issue before the jury" but commented that pictures
"emphasizing the horrors of the accident," such as blood on the pavement,
should not have been introduced. 98 Language of Railway Express Agency v.
Spain,99 indicates that the objection to photographs as being inflammatory
will not be seriously considered unless the objecting party contends that
the jury verdict is excessive.' 00
B. Unnecessary
Some opinions exclude demonstrative evidence by holding that the
particular exhibit is "unnecessary." Analysis suggests that this is not ap-
propriate terminology. Conceding that the offered evidence is both material
and relevant, and so not "unnecessary" in either of those senses, the nature
of the objection in contest seems to be that the evidence is inflammatory' 0'
or cumulative. 0 2 For example, a landmark case in food law 03 concerned a
commercial orange drink which was lacking in vitamin C, according to
Food and Drug Administration laboratory studies. Comparative photographs
of healthy guinea pigs regularly fed orange juice and those which had appar-
ently died in agony after being fed the beverage in question during con-
trolled tests were held "neither necessary nor proper." But the court, in
discussing admissibility, stated that "[i]t is impossible to calculate the
effect of such testimony in creating prejudice rather than objective convic-
tion in the minds of the jurors." 1'4
95. State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Mo. 1959).
96. 360 S.W.2d at 633.
97. 141 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940, error dism'd).
98. Id. at 744.
99. 249 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), appeal dismissed, question
moot, 152 Tex. 198, 255 S.W.2d 509 (1953).
100. Cf. Goldstein v. Fendelman, 336 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1960); Hanberry v.
Fitzgerald, 384 P.2d 256 (1963).
101. See text notes 89-100, supra.
102. See text notes 107, 108, supra.
103. U.S. v. 88 Cases, More or Less, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1951).
104. Id. at 975, emphasis supplied. This case has been seized upon as a land-
mark decision by defense counsel. See Mackall, "I Now Offer this Photograph in
Evidence," 20 INs. COUNSEL J. 110 (1953). See also Harper v. Bolton, 124 S.E.2d
54, 56 (S.C. 1962).
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In an early California case 0 5 the court excluded drawings showing the
condition of the defendant's damaged teeth. Commenting that the draw-
ing was not "necessary to illustrate the fact asserted, the opinion reasons
that "[t]he extent of the injury could be as well understood from the
statement of the dentist who repaired them."' 0 6 Apparently the court was
considering the evidence as cumulative and so "unnecessary."
It is submitted that counsel should phrase his objections in terms of
the evidence being inflammatory and cumulative rather than in terms of
its being unnecessary.
C. Cumulative
Trial courts have discretion to exclude testimony that is merely cumu-
lative and, since demonstrative evidence is usually intertwined with testi-
mony, the court should be able to exclude cumulative exhibits.10 7 On the
other hand, it is established that no reversible error occurs if cumulative
exhibits are admitted.'08
D. Gruesome
Although "[olne favorite ground for objection to the admissibility
of photographs in evidence is that it is too gruesome,"' 0 9 the general rule
is that gruesomeness per se does not render a photo inadmissible. 10 Pre-
siding Judge Storckman in a recent Missouri case" well-summarized appli-
cation of the rule:
Among other things, photographs are admissible to show the
nature and location of wounds, to refute self-defense, and to cor-
roborate and clarify the testimony of witnesses. The parallel
slash marks on the victim's arm and face and the wounds in the
area of the left temple are better understood when viewed on the
105 Thrall v. Smiley, 9 Cal. Rep. 529 (1858).
106. Id. at 537.
107. 6 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1907 (3d. ed. 1940); State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d. 484 (8th Cir. 1965).
108. ScoTr PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1022 (3d. ed. 1967); see People v. Dunn,
29 Cal. 2d. 654, 177 P.2d 533 (1947); Commonwealth v. Jones, 319 Mass. 228, 65
N.E.2d 422 (1946).
109. Powers, The Introduction and Use of Photographs and Spectographs in
Crimnal Trials in Alabama, 17 ALA. LAW. 197, 202 (1956).
110. Godvig v. Lopez, 185 Ore. 301, 202 P.2d 935 (1949) (pre-surgery photo-
graphs); Note, Admissibility of Gruesome Photographs, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 94 (1950);
Texas Employers Ins. Ass. v. Crow, 218 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) Aff'd,
148 Tex. 113, 221 S.W.2d 235, 10 A.L.R.2d 913 (1949).
111. State v. Perkins, 382 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964).
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exhibits than when described orally or in the written record. The
extent and location of other wounds on his hands and face are
more vividly portrayed and bear on the ability of (the victim)
to be an aggressor at the time he was mortally wounded. In his
statement to the police the defendant said he saw (the victim)
with a shotgun and he thought (he) was going to shoot him. An
instruction on self-defense was given as the issue was argued to
the jury. In oral argument defendant's counsel also suggested that
(defendant's wife) might have quarreled with (the victim) and
inflicted the wounds. The force and violence of the beating vividly
shown by the exhibits throws light on whether the wounds and
consequent death were inflicted by an outraged husband or the
faithless wife who had been living with her paramour for some time
in apparent harmony. For these and other reasons the photographs
constituted material evidence, and the fact that they were grue-
some was an unavoidable incident of a proper purpose.1 12
When confronted with gruesome exhibits, the advocate is advised to
phrase his objection in other terms.113 Scott' 4 lists a number of other "ob-
jection words" gleaned from the cases which can be selectively employed
in an effort to persuade the trial judge.
E. Indecent
An objection that an exhibit is indecent often raises similar problems
to those concerned with the inflammatory or gruesome quality of the
demonstrative evidence. The primary issue under this head, however, is
the basic scope limits to be established in public trials. When the exhibition
is otherwise proper, it should be allowed despite the fact that it borders on
the lewd or obscene. To quote Wigmore:
When justice and the discovery of truth are at stake, the
ordinary canons of modesty and delicacy of feeling cannot be al-
lowed to impose prohibition upon necessary measures. Where it is
a question of what would otherwise be an indecency, two limita-
112. Citing earlier Missouri authority: T'd. at 704-705. Wilkins v. State, 155
So.2d 129, 131 (1963 per Justice Thomas), ("True, blood spilled in a murder will
appear red and perhaps more gruesome than if it were black in a film taken
without color but... we do not comprehend how the one shown to have perpe-
trated the act can successfully complain about the shocking nature of pictures of
a horrible scene which he, himself, created."). See Getty, Blood, Bruises and
Photograprs, 1 SouTH TEXAS L. J. 282 (1954).
113. For example, in Perkins, counsel convinced Judge Romjue to exclude twophotographs of the interior of decedents skull taken during autopsy showing
fragmentation of bone apparently on a "cumulative" theory.
114. ScoTr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EvmrENcE § 1231 (3d ed. 1967).
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tions seem appropriate; (a) there should be a fair necessity for
the jury's inspection, the trial Court to determine; (b) the inspec-
tion should take place apart from the public court-room, in the
sole presence of the tribunal and the parties. Such seems to be the
inclination of the Courts. 1 5
IV. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the categories employed in this discussion are not
mutually exclusive. In highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the
various objections leveled at demonstrative evidence the goal of this discus-
sion is to aid the advocate in carrying his point with the judiciary,1 8
whether his argument is for or against admission of a particular piece of
demonstrative evidence." 7
Proponent must not only fulfill his procedural obligation to lay a
proper foundation for admission. He must justify his trial technique when
objections are raised and must be ready to expose fallacies in his opponent's
position.
The opponent, conversely, must be prepared to forward objections that
not only have a "ring of reason" but that are sound under the authorities.
Dictates of strategy may determine the timing of objections but their
phrasing must "follow the law." Our suggested breakdown of the various
objections should ease his task in this regard. Despite this opportunity for
skillful advocacy, counsel may at times be virtually helpless:
When I first called upon the prisoner, after he had furnished
me with some of the pertinent details (he was a disappointed
lover who had killed the woman he loved), I asked him how the
deceased was dressed at the time of the blow. He said, "in black."
115. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 261-262 (3d ed. 1940). Petty v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 354 Mo. 823, 191 S.W.2d 653 (1945). See South Highlands Infirmary v.
Camp, - Ala. -, 180 So.2d 904 (1965), and Scoa'r, PHOTOGRAPHIC Evi-
DE1CE § 1232 (2d ed. 1967). Compare Kinzell v. Chicago M. & St. Paul R.R. Co.,
33 Idaho 1, 190 P. 255 (1920) with "the proprietor of Ciro's . . .standing up
full view in the witness box and substituting for words the visual drama of rotary
grinds and bumps."
116. Shaffer, Bullets, Bad Florins, and Old Boots: A Report of the Indiana
Trial Jtdges Seminar on the Judge's Control Over Demonstrative Evidence, 39
NoaRE DAME LAw. 20 (1963). Appellate judges in Indiana also have mixed
thoughts. Kiefer v. State, 239 Ind. 103, 153 N.E.2d 899 (1958), later discussed in
Marshall v. State, 242 Ind. 606, 180 N.E.2d 233 (1962), and Hatfield v. State,
243 Ind. 279, 183 N.E.2d 198 (1962).
117. The possibilities for demonstrative evidence in varying types of litigation
is most recently shown by perusal of various articles contained in the current
Am. Jur Trials (12 volumes now published). Also, note that product liability
cases in which demonstrative evidence is employed are set out in FtrMER AMD
FRIEDMAN, 3 PRoDucTs LIABLITy § 49 (1966).
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I observed, "that was better than if the dress had been white."
Upon which the prisoner turned hastily around, and asked what
difference that could make. The reply was, "No difference in re-
gard to your offence, but a considerable difference in respect to
the effect produced upon the jury by the exhibition of the garments,
which, no doubt, will be resorted to." And so upon the trial it
turned out. The black dress was presented to the jury,--the eleven
punctures through the bosom pointed out; but no stain was ob-
servable, no excitement was produced. At last, however, they went
further, and produced some of the white undergarments-corsets,
etc., all besmeared with human blood. Upon this exhibition there
was not a dry eye in the courthouse. And the current of opinion
continued to run against the defendant from that moment until
the close of the case, and finally bore him into eternity.11
118. BROWN, II, THE FoRuM 448 (1856), as quoted by Wigmore, 4 WIGMoRE,
EvmENcE 252 (3d ed. 1940). Compare Miller v. Pate, 35 U.S. L. W- 4179 (Feb.
13, 1967 U.S. S. Ci).
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